THE A-86 LITHIUM CONSPIRATION IN BOLIVIA. (Part III)

THE CURSE OF EXTRACTIVISM 

Since anyone understands the difference between exporting minerals and importing machete knives, or computers, the government used "added value" to erase that difference; hence, highlighting it was labeled as "imperialist, rightist".

Pablo Villegas N., 5/12/19

At the end of September, the state-owned YLB partnered with the Chinese company Xinjiang TBEA Group Baocheng to make investments that are part of the following projects

• Pastos Grandes Salt Lake: 1,070 MM $ on a Lithium Chloride Plant and a Lithium Carbonate Plant, both 100% state-owned, and a Metallic Lithium Plant (YLB 51% and TBEA-BAOCHENG 49%). ⁱ
• Coipasa Salt Lake: 1,320 MM $ on a Potassium Sulfate Plant (100% YLB) and a Lithium Hydroxide Plant, a Boric Acid Plant, a Pure Bromine Plant, a Sodium Bromide Plant (YLB 51% and TBEA-BAOCHENG 49%)ⁱⁱ

Have you seen the word “batteries” somewhere? You didn't, right?

That is, Bolivia will continue its eternal export of raw materials.

The ACISA case was exemplary of government policy. The government informed that the deal with this company included the production of batteries, but ACISA denied it publiclyⁱⁱⁱ. 

All was about raw materials.

Furthermore, the agreement YLB-ACISA had some colonialist traits; more than 80% of the production would be exported exclusively to Europe (and Germany); ACISA was responsible for the sale of the total amount of lithium hydroxide produced by the project; Bolivia was not allowed to search for other markets while the company was in force.^iv Shall we call it "nationalism"?


A company shareholders would never allow one of them to take the control of the company marketing department as if it were an association between a colony and a colonialist power; the YLB did it.

In 2006, Morales assumed the execution of the "October agenda", -resulting of the 2003 uprising-, which included the industrialization of natural resources to free the country from the curse of extractivism.

Since the "curse" continued to worsen over time, the Morales clique used to insistently interexchange "industrialization" with "added value" (the increase in the value of an item along the production process), term that applies equally, e.g., to the production of iron ore or a machete knife.

Since anyone understands the difference between exporting minerals and importing machete knives, or computers, the government used "added value" to erase that difference; hence, highlighting it was labeled as "imperialist, rightist" or so.

It is not just a semantic issue. The trick was profitable for ACISA. According to Zuleta, since lithium hydroxide was considered a "refined" (industrialized) product, the company would not pay royalties to Potosí for the 30,000 to 40,000 tons of annual production over the next 70 years. Potosí would only get royalties for the lithium carbonate produced by the YLB, which anyway would be diminished due to its refined product status.^v

There is the fiasco of almost 14 years of “industrialization”; ...no cars, no batteries, no industrialization.

Instead of the technological development we threaten developed countries with, we got one of the worst energy density index in Latin America (the penultimate place), which besides a general technological backwardness implies a greater environmental impact (and social) in exchange for a lower economic benefit; we got also state companies that in 14 years did not obtain a single fucking patent. Not to mention the very low international ranking of Bolivian universities.

With respect to the power to establish the international price of lithium, the previous government only repeated our history with silver, tin, rubber, etc., which never gave us the possibility to influence prices.

As to the nationalized sector, or state owned enterprises: from the point of view of the international market, it does not matter so much if the raw materials come from a private or state company, provided that the flow flows^vi, as happened with gas exports under Morales regime, that almost emptied the reserves. Look here how much of gas industrialization there is.

Now, to socialism. Andre Vltchek argued that Morales' government led:

“...an extremely successful socialist process in what was once one of the poorest countries in South America.”vii

The author seems to conceive of socialism as an attitude, not as an economic system, so we won't waste time here. Otherwise, he would have it hard trying to prove with numbers that Bolivia is no longer among the last positions in the lists of underdevelopment indicators in Latin America, or among the first in cases such as corruption or dependence on raw materials exports.

Finally, there is obviously a relationship between rough materials (lithium included) and geopolitics. Nevertheless, the thesis of the coup is based on the biased overlap of geopolitical generalities to poorly known circumstances; this means that the factual basis of the lithium coup thesis is false.

Now then, once discarded the word lithium, "coup d'etat" remains. That will be the subject of Part IV.

NOTES

i “YLB y XINJIANG TBEA GROUP firman Minuta de Constitución de la empresa mixta para la industrialización de los salares de Pastos Grandes y Coipasa”. Fuente: YLB, 21/8/19

http://tinyurl.com/ugvkkp8

iiOp. cit.

iii “Empresa alemana aclara que no fabricará baterías de litio en Bolivia”. Brujula Digital, 14/12/2018

http://tinyurl.com/rcvxyfw

iv Juan Carlos Zuleta Calderón: “Por entreguista e ilegal, Potosí pide abrogar el DS 3738 sobre el litio” bolpress.com, 9/10/19

http://tinyurl.com/tsyl6t4

v Juan Carlos Zuleta Calderón: Op.cit.

vi Pablo Villegas N: “El problema de las estatales”, en Geopolítica de las Carreteras y el Saqueo de los Recursos Naturales, pg 145. CEDIB, 2013.

vii Andre Vltchek: “Evo Overthrown, But Bolivian Socialism Will be Victorious!” BlogviewAndre Vltchek Archive, 15/11/19

http://tinyurl.com/ugagg2s